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A Comparative Study of the
Law of Palliative Care and
End-of-Life Treatment
Danuta Mendelson and
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

the practice of medicine and the conduct of medical practitioners. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have
common law systems in which the law is based on judgemade precedents as well as legislation. The legal systems of
Poland, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands are
based primarily on national civil and criminal codes, though
their appellate courts do make authoritative rulings on the
law. This article will examine the common law countries
together, as they share a common legal tradition and common precedents, while the civil law systems, which are more
diverse, will be examined separately.
To add to the complexity, national laws of members of
the European Union, including the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and France, are subject to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms4
(ECHR) as interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg. Poland, as an aspiring member of the
European Union, is adapting its laws to fit in with the European Union's jurisprudence.'
Finally, the national laws of individual countries are
shaped by the history, community values, economics, culture, religious orientation, and current predominant legal
philosophy of those countries. In this article, we will highlight only the major issues, similarities, differences, and
problems raised by these factors.

Quinlancase a quarter of a century ago, three American
Court
decisions'
a host
of state
ince Supreme
the Supreme
Court
of Newand
Jersey
decided
the
appellate decisions have addressed end-of-life issues. 2 These
decisions, as well as legislation addressing the same issues,
have prompted a torrent of law journal articles analyzing
every aspect of end-of-life law. In recent years, moreover, a
number of law review articles, many published in this journal, have also specifically addressed legal issues raised by
palliative care.3 Much less is known in the United States,
however, as to how other countries address these issues.
Reflection on the experience and analysis of other nations
may give Americans a better understanding of their own experience, as well as suggest improvements to their present
way of dealing with the difficult problems in this area.
This article offers a conceptual and comparative analysis of major legal issues relating to end-of-life treatment and
to the treatment of pain in a number of countries. In particular,
it focuses on the law of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Poland, France, the Netherlands, German); and Japan.
The legal analysis of end-of-life and pain treatment is
complex. It can involve issues of criminal law and the law of
battery and negligence (tort/delict) as well as constitutional
and international law. Legal analysis of these problems is
shaped by the juridical system and philosophy of each country, as well as by international conventions that have been
incorporated into the law of the respective countries.
Poland, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United
Kingdom (devolved administration in Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland) are unitary systems, whereas Canada, Germany, and Australia are federations, in which the legislatures
of constituent provinces or states have the power to regulate

CoNsE•r AND REFusAL OF TREATmwr
As a general rule, all common law and most civil law jurisdictions presume every adult person to have the mental
capacity to consent to or to refuse any medical intervention,
including life-saving or life-sustaining treatment, unless and
until that presumption is rebutted. 6 It is irrelevant that the
refusal may not be in the best interests of the patient, or that
the decision may entail a risk of death. 7 The refusal must,
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gence; and in accordance with proper professional standards
of palliative care." If these requirements are met, then "for
the purposes of the law of the State, the administration of
medical treatment for the relief of pain or distress ... does
not constitute an intervening cause of death.""l

however, be unequivocal and often must be recorded in writing. The right to refuse medical treatment is based on the
principle of personal autonomy, and was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in Pretty v. the United
Kingdom,' which noted that the right to refuse treatment
conforms with the privacy guarantees contained in Article 8
of the ECHR?

Withdrawal and withholding of medical treatment
from incompetent or unconscious patients where
there is no advance directive
In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but not in Scot-

LEGAL APPROACHES TO END-OF-LiFE TREATMENT IN
COMMON LAW COUNTRIES

land,'" the discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration
for a patient in a vegetative state requires the prior sanction

In general, the common law countries (the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia) have adopted very similar philosophical and juridical approaches toward end-of-life treatment.
This is true with respeci to palliative care, withholding and
termination of life-sustaining treatment, assisted suicide, and
active euthanasia.

of a High Court20 by way of a declaration based on the best

interests test.21The seminal common law case on the withdrawal of artificial life supports from incompetent persons is

Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland.2 Anthony Bland, at the age
of 17, sustained catastrophic and irreversible damage to the

higher centers of his brain, which left him in a persistent

vegetative state. The House of Lords decided that doctors
might lawfully discontinue biochemical and other life support systems from a patient in a persistent vegetative state
where the cessation of nourishment and hydration is an omission, and not an act.
The House of Lords reasoned that nonconsensual treatment violates the principle of personal autonomy. Incompetent
patients may, however, be treated nonvoluntarily on the basis
of the doctrine of necessity where their best interests require
that the treatment be administered "for the protection of the
plaintiff's health and possibly his [sapient] life."21 Once it
becomes clear that the patient is permanently comatose or in
a persistent vegetative state, however, his or her interests in
being kept alive have ceased, taking with them the justification for the nonconsensual medical treatment, even though
termination of life supports will also not further the person's
best interests. In such circumstances, according to the House
of Lords, there is no longer a duty to provide nourishment
and hydration, and therefore failure to do so cannot constitute a criminal offense. Thus, Lord Goff of Chieveley observed:

Palliative care
The most controversial legal issue with respect to palliative
care in the countries under consideration has been the use of

opioids to alleviate patients' suffering in their final stages of
life, particularly when the opioids are suspected of causing
0
death. In the 1957 English case of R. v. Adams,1 Dr. John
Bodkin Adams was charged with murder when it was dis-

covered that he had treated a number of elderly patients who

had died in his care with high doses of narcotic analgesics. In
his address to the jury, Lord Justice Devlin said that a physician "is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to
relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may
incidentally shorten life.""
This approach is sometimes called the doctrine of double
effect. Under this doctrine, the cause of death of patients
who die while receiving pain treatment will be attributed to
the underlying disease in situations where the patient's pain
and other discomforts are controlled through properly calibrated titration of dosages, even if the dosages are high.12
This is because the law sees a sharp distinction between
appropriate palliative care, offered with an intention to ease
a patient's pain and suffering, and actions specifically aimed
at ending a patient's life."3 This approach has been adopted
by the House of Lords,14 the Supreme Court6 of Canada,'"
and the Supreme Court of the United States.'
The High Court of Australia has yet to determine this
issue. However, the South Australian Consent to Medical

For my part, I cannot see that medical treatment is
appropriate or requisite simply to prolong a
patient's life when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind, as where it is futile
because the patient is unconscious and there is no
24
prospect of any improvement in his condition.

Treatment and Palliative Care Act of 199517 provides that

In 2001, the High Court of England in NationalHealth
Service Trust A. v. M.; N.H.S. Trust B. v. H.11 reexamined
and affirmed the reasoning of the House of Lords in Bland
in light of the ECHR. 26
In Australia, doctors must apply the best interests standard when treating incompetent patients who have not
executed a binding advance directive. The legal situation

medical practitioners will not incur civil or criminal liability for administering medical treatment with the intention of
relieving the pain or distress of patients in the terminal phase
of a terminal illness, even though an incidental effect of the

treatment would be to hasten the death of the patient, providing they do so "with the consent of the patient or the

patient's representative; and in good faith and without negli131
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regarding withdrawal and withholding of life-saving or lifesustaining treatment is, however, unclear. In Marion'sCase,27
the High Court of Australia determined that where persons
are disabled by age or mental incapacity from giving valid
consent, an order or direction must be sought from the Family Court or Guardianship Board for authorization of
nontherapeutic procedures. Since discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment is nontherapeutic, it might be prudent for
doctors to seek similar directions.u
The South Australian Consent to Medical Treatment
and Palliative Care Act is an exception to this general rule
insofar as it provides that, in cases where there is no valid
prior direction to the contrary, a medical practitioner responsible for the treatment or care of a patient in the terminal
phase of a terminal illness is "under no duty to use, or to
continue to use, life sustaining measures in treating the patient if the effect of doing so would be merely to prolong life
in a moribund state without any real prospect of recovery or
in a persistent vegetative state."2" In such cases, "the nonapplication or discontinuance of life sustaining measures...
does not constitute an intervening cause of death (i.e. novus
actus interveniens:
a cause that breaks a pre-existing chain of
30
causation)."

In Canada, a similar regime prevails. The Manitoba
Court of Appeal has ruled that physicians have a unilateral
right to make nontreatment decisions.3"
Assisted suicide and active euthanasia
The common law distinguishes between a physician's conduct in letting a patient die from an underlying disease and
conduct that makes the patient die. It is the intention to
bring about the death of another that forms the basis of the
crimes of assisted suicide and murder.
In Canada, the question of whether the right to refuse
life-saving treatment should encompass the right to assisted
suicide was determined in 1993 in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),32 a case involving a 42-year-old
woman who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Mrs.
Rodriguez argued that the right to refuse medical treatment
was a "liberty and security of the person" interest, protected
by S7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights. She contended that
she had a constitutional right to have a qualified physitian
set up technological means by which she might end her life
when she was no longer able to enjoy life, by her own hand,
and at the time of her choosing. She applied for an order that
S241 (b) of the Criminal Code,"3 which prohibits the giving
of assistance to commit suicide, be declared invalid on the
ground that by precluding a terminally ill person from committing "physician-assisted" suicide, it violated her rights
under S 7.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined
that the Canadian Charter does not require lifting the statutory ban against assisted suicide because S 7 of the Charter

protects three fundamental values: (1)the notion of personal
autonomy relating to the right to make choices concerning
one's own body; (2) freedom from state interference with
respect to control over one's physical and psychological integrity and basic human dignity; and (3) the sanctity of life.
The court noted: "even when death appears imminent, seeking to control the manner and timing of one's death constitutes
a conscious choice of death over life." 34 Even though the
prohibition of assisted suicide in S 241(b) of the Criminal
Code impinged upon the first two values, these were trumped
by the third value - protecting and maintaining respect for
human life. In 1995, the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide recommended that
the prohibition against assisted suicide remain intact.3 A 2001 English case with very similar facts and outcome was determined by the House of Lords in R. (Pretty)v.
the Directorof Public Prosecutions.3 6 Dianne Pretty had a
motor neurone disease, a progressive neuro-degenerative disease of motor cells within the central nervous system. She
was paralyzed from the neck downwards and confined to a
wheelchair.37 She requested the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of the United Kingdom to agree in advance not to
prosecute her husband were he to help her to commit suicide. Under S 2(1) of the Suicide Act of 1961 (U.K.),3" it is a
criminal offense with a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment for a person to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the
suicide of another.
The House of Lords determined, and the European Court
of Human Rights affirmed (unanimously dismissing Mrs.
Pretty's appeal), that there is no right to assisted suicide under common law or statute, and that no such right is
guaranteed by the ECHR. The European Court of Human
Rights declared that Article 2, which safeguards the right to
life, cannot be interpreted as "conferring the diametrically
opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right
to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an indi3
vidual the entitlement to choose death rather than life." 9
The court noted that although the conditions of terminally
ill individuals vary, many patients will be vulnerable, and it
is the vulnerability of the class that provides the rationale for
40
the law against assisted suicide.

There have been no appellate decisions regarding assisted suicide in Australia. As in all other common law
jurisdictions, aiding and abetting suicide is a statutory offense punishable by imprisonment 4in all Australian states
and the Australian Capital Territory. 1
Active euthanasia or mercy killing is a crime in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In Australia, in 1995,
the Northern Territory's Parliament enacted the Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act of 1995 (RTIA), 42 which decriminalized physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia by designating
such conduct as legitimate "medical treatment."43 In 1997,
the Federal Parliament, pursuant to the plenary powers vested
in it to make laws for the government of the Territories un132
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Medical Ethics, or if they act contrary to both the law and
the Code.
The conflict between legal rules and ethical norms is
particularly acute in the case of withdrawal and withholding
of life-saving treatment. There are no substantive law provisions in Poland that specify limits to the medical duty to
institute or continue to provide life-sustaining treatment to
incompetent terminally ill patients. Article 38 of Chapter 5,
headed "Principles of Medical Practice," in the Medical Profession Act of 2002 provides, however, that a "physician may
decide to discontinue or not institute a treatment (unless
prompt medical intervention is necessary)...."61
The qualifying clause "unless prompt medical intervention is necessary" refers to the "duty to rescue" provision
contained in Article 30 of the Medical Profession Act.6' Article 30 imposes upon medical practitioners a duty to always
save human life when a delay would result in death or seri6
ous physical or mental injury, or in other cases of emergency."
The positive duty to act to save human life is in line with
"the duty to rescue" expressed in Article 162.1 of the Penal
Code, which provides a punishment of up to three years
imprisonment for failure to help a person who is in immediate danger of death or serious injury, where rendering such
help is possible without the risk of death or serious injury to
oneself."
It is difficult to reconcile Article 162 of the Penal Code
and Article 30 of the Medical Profession Act with Article 32
of the Code of Medical Ethics that vests in the medical practitioner the right to decide whether to discontinue resuscitation
or "persistent treatment," having regard to the patient's medical chances of survival. Article 32 of the Code provides:

der S 122 of the Commonwealth Constitution, enacted the
Euthanasia Laws Act of 1997 (Cth), which amended the

Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act of 1978 nullifying the RTIA.V
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Latimer
determined the issue of mercy killing motivated by the "necessity" of eliminating pain.4' Robert Latimer, a Saskatchewan
farmer, asphyxiated his 12-year-old daughter, Tracy, who had
a severe form of cerebral palsy, by venting exhaust fumes
from his pickup truck's tail pipe into the cab where he had
4
placed Tracy. He was convicted of second-degree murder
and received the mandatory minimum sentence of life im47
prisonment without parole eligibility for 10 years. The
Supreme Court of Canada in an unanimous decision dis48
missed Latimer's appeals against conviction and sentence.
The court stated that "[t]he harm inflicted in this case was
ending a life; that harm was immeasurably more serious

than the pain resulting from Tracy's operation, which Mr.
Latimer sought to avoid," 49 concluding that:

Killing a person - in order to relieve the suffering
produced by amedically manageable physical or mental
condition - is not a proportionate response to the
harm represented by the non-life-threatening suf0
fering resulting from that condition.,
POLAND
Medical practice in Poland is governed by the Medical Profession Act (2002),11 the Health Service Institutions Act
(1991),s2 the Law on Physicians' Associations (1989),13 and
the Code of Medical Ethics (1993), as well as the Polish
Penal Code (1997)14 and the Constitution of the Polish Republic (1997).51
The Code of Medical Ethics includes provisions relating specifically to treatment of patients at the end of life. It is
not a legal statute, however, and as such is not a source of
law. Nevertheless, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its
Opinion of October 7, 199256 determined that, although the
norms set out in the Code of Medical Ethics have the charac57
ter of deontological norms rather than legal rules, they can
be used to define more precisely the content of legal rules.
Indeed, in medical courts, specific articles of the Code are
58
invoked in proceedings against medical practitioners. Medical practitioners, therefore, are under a legal obligation to
9
adhere to the ethical norms of the Code of Medical Ethics."
This general rule, however, is subject to qualification in cases
where there is conflict between the norms of the Code and
substantive (statutory) law. According to the Constitutional
Tribunal's Opinion of March 17, 1993, a medical practitioner cannot be penalized for practicing medicine in accordance
with the law, even if such conduct is contrary to a principle
of professional ethics.'0 Conversely, medical practitioners will
be punished if they infringe the law, but not the Code of

(1) In terminal states the physician does not have the
duty to undertake and continue resuscitation or

persistent treatment, nor to resort to extraordinary
measures, and
(2) The decision to discontinue resuscitation rests with
the physician and should be based on the assessment
of the likely therapeutic success.
Yet, unless the conflict between the substantive civil and
criminal law and the Code of Medical Ethics can be resolved, substantive law - that is, the duty to rescue - will
6
prevail over deontological and ethical principles. "
Under Article 150 of the Polish Penal Code (1997),66
mercy killing is prohibited by law, but may or may not attract a custodial penalty. Article 31 of the Code of Medical
7
Ethics prohibits the practice of active euthanasia.Y According to the Constitutional Tribunal's Opinion of March 17,
1993, medical practitioners who practice euthanasia - con8
duct that is contrary to the substantive law6 and medical
ethics - will be held legally responsible for the patient's
death, even if they personally regard such intervention to be
justified. 69
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FRANCE
0 has
Since 1989 the French Council of State (Conseild'Etat)7
given priority to European Union law over inconsistent national law, 71 and the Constitutional Council (Conseil
constitutionnel)has obliged all French courts to apply the
provisions of the ECHR where a French statute is incompatible with the ECHRL' 2
Following the May 1999 draft recommendation by the
Council of Europe, encouraging member states to give incurable and dying patients the right to palliative care, 73 the
French Parliament enacted the law of June 9, 1999 directed
at guaranteeing access to palliative care for anyone "whose
state of ill health requires it."' 4 The law of June 9, 1999
reinforces Article 3 8 of the 1995 Code of Medical Deontology, which, unlike the Polish Code of Medical Ethics, has
statutory force, and is thus legally binding.75 The Code of
Medical Deontology mandates that:

a dying person must be attended until the last, and
given appropriate care and suitable support to preserve the quality of the life which is ending. A
patient's dignity should be protected, and his or
her entourage comforted.76
Though the emphasis is on alleviation of "sufferings"
(les souffrances),and on the preservation of the dying person's
quality of life, the law provides statutory encouragement for
doctors to treat their patients with adequate doses of analgesic medication. The care provided must be "conscientious
and accord with the scientific data."7"
Article 37 of the Code of Medical Deontology cautions
medical practitioners to "avoidany unreasonable obstinacy
in pursuing investigations and treatments." In the context of
the provision, the reference is presumably to avoid "aggressive" or "futile" treatment, which may or may not encompass
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.'7
Competent patients in France have a statutory right to
refuse proposed treatment." The law also grants relatives
the right to be warned and informed, but gives them no
power to make binding treatment decisions on behalf of an
incompetent patient.10 France has neither statutory rules nor
medicoethical guidelines8 " governing the withholding and
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent
patients. Indeed, the legal position relating to withholding
and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is complex. One
of the problems stems from the definition of fault in French
law. At common law, the question of whether an omission
amounts to a legal fault depends on the scope of the duty. In
cases of withholding or discontinuance of treatment, the
question is whether the physician is under a duty to undertake or continue life-sustaining treatment for the particular
patient. In France, for purposes of legal responsibility, the
concept of fault by omission in the sense of abstention within
an action (fauted'abstentiondans l'action)'2 is governed by a
134

general principle rather than case-specific considerations:
Once the treatment has been undertaken, withdrawal of treatment that leads to the deterioration of the patient's condition
and consequent death will amount to a legal fault. Under the
French doctrine of "unity of criminal and civil faults," physicians who withdraw or terminate treatment may be liable
under civil as well as criminal law.
Just as in Poland, the well-entrenched positive duty to
rescue a person in danger embodied in Article 223-6(2) of
the new 1992 Criminal Code (Article 63 ofrthe old Criminal
Code) makes a failure to rescue an offense (d6llit).13 The
medical duty to assist is expressed in a mandatory form in
4
Article 9 of the Code of Medical Deontology.1
The crime of failure to rescue belongs in the category of
"endangering behavior" offenses (mise en dangerd6liberge
5
de la personne d'autrui);'
the category also includes the offense of deliberately exposing a person to danger of death or
injury (Article 223-1 of the new Criminal Code). Decisions
to discontinue vasopressive drugs, undertake terminal weaning from ventilation, or withhold cardiopulmonary
resuscitation and mechanical ventilation from a patient would
fall within these categories of offense. In 1996, an anesthesiologist who decided to extubate and withhold resuscitation
from a patient who had no chance of recovery or survival
was convicted of involuntary homicide by the Court of Appeal of Rouen on the grounds that the doctor's conduct was
"against all logic, medical ethics and accepted rules of good
practice."16The Court of Cassation (CourdeCassation)dismissed
the physician's appeal." French jurists haVe interpreted the decision in the context of the debate about legalizing the practice of
euthanasia and assisted suicide." The Court of Cassation's reasoning is in harmony with the second clause of Article 38 of
the Code of Medical Deontology, which mandates that a
physician "has no right to deliberately bring about death."
Inciting (provoquer) another to commit suicide is a crime
under Article 223-13 of the Criminal Code, punishable by
three years imprisonment. Providing drugs, lethal substances,
or mechanical devices designed to enable a patient to commit suicide would come within the ambit of this offense.
Encouragement and advertising of methods to commit suicide are offenses against the person under Article 223-14 of
the Criminal Code. However, with the advent of the World
Wide Web, this law may be difficult to police.,9
With regard to active euthanasia, Article 221-1 of the
Criminal Code states: "voluntarily killing another constitutes
murder," and is punishable by 30 years imprisonment. The
offense of homicide has to be a positive intentional act rather
than an abstention that causes death.10 Killing another person on request would fulfill the requirement. The French
Criminal Code includes a specific offense of poisoning, defined as "attacking the life of another through the use or
administration of substances that cause death," which is also
punishable by 30 years imprisonment. 91In the prosecution
of employees from the French National Blood Transfusion
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Centre (CentreNationalde TransfusionSanguine) for knowingly placing on the market unheated blood products infected
with HIV, the Court of Cassation did not exclude the possicould be made out without
bility that the offense of poisoning
2
the specific intention to kill.9
In 1999, a criminal penalty was imposed on a hospital
physician for "accompanying into death" a 92-year-old comatose and hemiplegic woman who developed gangrene.
The physician injected the patient with 5 grams of potassium
chloride.93 The National Council of theýOrder of Physicians
suspended the defendant for one year from medical practice
for violation of the second clause of Article 38 of the Code of
Medical Deontology."
GERMANY

Article 2, ¶ 2 of the German Constitution recognizes that
"everyone has a right to life and to bodily integrity." In the
context of other medicolegal controversies, such as those
involving abortion or research involving human embryos,
Germany has taken a strong "pro-life" position. Indeed,
Germany's historical burden from the Nazi period is often
invoked as imposing upon Germany the obligation to provide leadership to the world in fighting to recognize and
preserve the sanctity of life.s
The German Constitution also, however, recognizes rights
to "free development of personality,"' "inviolable freedom,"97
and "inviolable dignity."' 8 In fact, as the law of decisionmaking at the end of life has developed in Germany, the right
to free and autonomous decision-making has uniformly
trumped the right to life. German law governing end-of-life
decisions is at this point driven primarily, indeed almost solely,
by the principle of autonomous decision-making.
Since at least the 1950s, the German courts have recognized the right of patients to refuse medical treatment.99 It is
beyond dispute that a competent dying patient in Germany
can refuse treatment intended to extend his or her life. If an
informed patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, the treatment must be terminated. This is referred to in Germany as
"passive Sterbehilfe," and isgenerally accepted.
The right to self-determination for the competent patient extends beyond this, however. Suicide is not illegal in
0
Germany.°0 While the law does prohibit active euthanasia,' '
in a 2001 case, the German Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshot)held that the psychologist-leader of an
assisted suicide group who aided an elderly woman suffering
from multiple sclerosis and other infirmities to commit suicide by supplying a deadly drug was not guilty of causing her
death.'02 The court accepted that the patient was responsible
for her own death, and that the defendant, who assisted her
by supplying the means of death, was not responsible. However, the court did affirm the defendant's conviction for
violating the controlled substances laws in supplying the drug,
rejecting the defendant's defense of necessity.

A doctor's assistance in a patient's suicide can collide
with the well-recognized duty of rescue imposed upon doctors by German law. In the 1984 Wittig case, the German
Supreme Court held that a doctor who does not try to forestall the consequences of an attempted suicide may be
criminally liable.103 In the 1988 Hackethal case, however,
the Supreme Court suggested that the doctor may be freed
from the obligation to rescue if the patient experienced his
life as torture and wanted to escape it;10 and in the 2001
case noted above, the court held that the duty of rescue did
not apply since the patient, upon taking the drug, became
rapidly unconscious and beyond help.
The right of self-determination recognized in these cases
does not end when the patient becomes incompetent. In its
judgment of September 13, 1994, the German Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the right of an incompetent patient's
representative to refuse treatment. In that case, the son and
the physician of a 70-year-old patient with irreversible brain
damage had requested the nursing staff of an institution to
05
discontinue nutrition and hydration.' The nursing staff refused and notified the guardian court, which in turn informed
the prosecutor, resulting in the physician's and the son's prosecution for attempted manslaughter. The Supreme Court
reversed a guilty verdict, recognizing that the patient's right
to self-determination encompasses a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and that this right could be exercised on
behalf of incompetents where sufficient evidence exists, based
on the patient's written or oral statements, religious views,
and values, that the person would have declined treatment.
German law presently provides several avenues for decision-making for incompetents.'" The first possibility is the
7
living will (Patientverflgungen).0 Patients may, while competent, expressly spell out what they want done in the event
of future incapacity. Living wills do not seem to have the
force that they have in the United States, but are rather a
datum to consider in making end-of-life determinations. In
practice, however, if a recent living will is available that
addresses the situation at hand, it will probably be followed.
Second, patients may grant another person a power of attorney to make medical decisions (Vorsorgevollmachten) in the
future event of incapacity; this must be done expressly in
writing while competent.'0° Third, a patient may nominate a
guardian (Betreuer)for the guardianship court to appoint in
the event of incapacity. Under the guardianship law, the guardianship court must approve any medical decisions made by a
guardian or power of attorney that0 threaten death or will
have long-lasting effects on health.' ' In its widely reported
decision of July 20, 1998, the State Supreme Court of Frankfurt am Main held that the daughter and guardian of an
85-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative (but not terminal) condition could have artificial nutrition and hydration
withdrawn (in accordance with the earlier expressed wishes
of the mother), but that the approval of the guardianship
court needed to be obtained. It is arguable, however, that
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guardian court approval is not necessary if the patient is in
the process of dying. 110
Where no living will, person holding a power of attorney, or guardian exists, the attending physician must attempt
to determine what the incompetent patient would have
wanted done in the situation (mutmafllichen Willen). This
should be discerned considering the patient's earlier statements, religious convictions, and attitude toward pain, as
well as from the seriousness of the patient's current condition."' If it is impossible to sort out the patient's presumed
will, the doctor should decide in the patient's best interests.
Though German law places a heavy emphasis on the
patient's right of self-determination, it also emphasizes the
obligations of physicians to dying patients. In particular, the
doctor has an obligation to protect the patient from pain. In
several cases, health care professionals have been found liable in civil and criminal law for causing unnecessary pain
to patients by failing to provide adequate pain therapy.1 2
Moreover, the doctor who does attempt to protect a patient
from pain can expect the protection of the law. In a 1996
case, the German Supreme Court held that a doctor who
provided a dying patient with medically indicated pain medication in accordance with the expressed or presumed wishes
of the patient, perhaps hastening the patient's death as a resuit, did not break the law." 3 This process is referred to in
the German literature as IndirektSterbehilfe.
Nevertheless, some critics have charged that German
doctors are reluctant to provide adequate pain therapy. A
recent article by Klaus Kutzer, a justice of the German Supreme Court, quotes Professor Dr. Zens as stating that
prescribing opiates in Germany for pain treatment lags 10
years behind other European countries."' Dr. Kutzer suggested that this might in part be due to restrictive
interpretations of the German controlled substances regulations. Despite a commitment to palliative care as an
alternative to euthanasia, palliative care still seems underdeveloped in Germany."'

JAPAN

The law respecting end-of-life decisions seems somewhat
less developed in Japan than in the other countries in our
study." 6 No statutory scheme has emerged for dealing with
end-of-life decisions, and only a handful of judicial precedents give guidance. There is also little legal authority on
pain management.
Patient autonomy is not as firmly established in Japan as
in other countries. The principle of patient decision-making
is certainly recognized. Indeed, a recent Japanese Supreme
Court decision unanimously concluded that doctors who transfused a Jehovah's Witness against her express instructions
had infringed her personal rights, and awarded damages for
emotional distress.117 Nevertheless, Japanese doctors are reluctant to disclose much information to their patients, and
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generally expect patients to follow their directions.)' In particular, doctors are reluctant to disclose (and patients perhaps
reluctant to receive) terminal diagnoses (especially a diagnosis of cancer), apparently believing that the patient will give
up trying to survive in the face of such a diagnosis. Japanese
doctors are more likely to disclose the diagnosis to the family, and work with the family to deceive the patient.'"
Article 202 of the Japanese Criminal Code prohibits
assistance in suicide or killing another on request. Physicians rely on this statute in refusing requests to terminate
end-of-life treatment. On the other hand, once doctors
decide that further treatment is not indicated, they can
rely on Article 35 of the Criminal Code, which offers a
defense of justification for acts done "in the course of
legitimate business."' 20
Two reported court decisions involving euthanasia are
the primary sources of end-of-life decision-making law in
Japan. The first was the 1962 Nagoya High Court decision,"'
in which a son was charged with "ascendant homicide" (the
aggravated crime of killing one's ancestor) for poisoning his
terminally ill father, who was suffering great pain, allegedly
at the father's request.
The court countenanced the possibility that euthanasia
could be legally permissible, but identified six conditions
that had to be present: (1) the patient must be suffering from
an incurable and imminently terminal condition; (2) the patient must be suffering unbearable and unrelievable pain; (3)
the patient must be killed with the intention of alleviating
the pain; (4) the act should be done only at the patient's
explicit request; (5) the euthanasia should normally be carried out by a physician; and (6) the euthanasia must be carried
out through ethically acceptable means.
The court held that the final two conditions had not
been met in the particular case, and thus convicted the son,
though he was sentenced to only four years in prison, with
three suspended, for what was a potentially capital crime. In
four subsequent cases of euthanasia by relatives, various courts
found one or more criteria to be lacking and thus found the
defendants guilty, but in each case the defendant was given a
relatively light sentence.,2
The other reported case involving euthanasia, a 1995
case from the Yokohama District Court, involved the criminal prosecution of a doctor who had, in response to a patient's
family's insistent and incessant requests, first terminated
nutrition and hydration, then injected the patient with high
doses of analgesics, and finally injected the patient with
verapamil hydrochloride and potassium chloride, causing the
patient's death. '2 The court convicted the doctor of murder,
but sentenced him to only two years in prison.
The court held that treatment,of patients can be terminated if death is unavoidable and the patient is in the final
stages of an incurable disease. The court suggested that more
than one doctor should make the judgment of the impossibility of recovery and the patient should make an informed
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expression of his or her wish that treatment cease. If the
patient is unable to consent, the family should be given accurate information about the patient's condition and then be
allowed to state the patient's "inferred intent," based on its
knowledge of the patient's character and values. The court
expressed its hope that patients would have living wills in
the future, but also stated that if a living will was vague or
remote. in time it might not be of much use. The court concluded that life support measures (including artificial nutrition
and hydration) could be terminated as well as other treatment measures, but the decision regarding the timing and
termination of treatment was a medical judgment, presumably primarily for doctors to make.
With respect to euthanasia, the court distinguished between passive euthanasia (the cessation of life-sustaining
treatment), indirect euthanasia (terminal sedation), and active euthanasia. The court stated that euthanasia is only
appropriate if: (1) the physical pain is difficult to bear (mental suffering does not suffice); (2) the time of unavoidable
death is near; (3) methods of eliminating the pain are exhausted; and (4) there is a dear expression of intent to accept
death. Active euthanasia is permissible only if death is imminent, but indirect euthanasia can be used to hasten death.
Active euthanasia is also only permissible if there is a clear
expression of the patient's intent - substituted judgment
does not suffice. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, can
be based on medical judgment as to futility and on the family's
statement of intent, based on the patient's inferred intent, as
noted above.
In the particular.case (where the doctor had injected the
patient with verapamil hydrochloride and potassium chloride at the family's request), the court held that-active
euthanasia was inappropriate because there was no informed
consent on the part of the patient (who had not been told he
was dying of cancer), the patient was unconscious and therefore not experiencing pain, and the family had not been told
that the patient was not in pain. The court also faulted the
doctor for relying on the family's judgment, as he had only
known them a short time, and for buckling under the son's
insistence on euthanasia, given the doctor's "higher status
and position."
The law that emerges from these cases contrasts with
the law of the United States and other common law countries in that it is more open to active euthanasia, but more
reticent to accept withdrawal of treatment (which is effectively treated as a form of euthanasia). The two court
decisions, for example, did not seem to countenance withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a nonterminal patient
in a persistent vegetative state. Advance directives have no
particular legal status in Japan, though several organizations offer advance directive forms and encourage their
use. 124
Japan has a very strict narcotic law, and medical use of
25
narcotics is much more limited than in other countries.'

One expert states: "Such a rigid and complicated system of
justifying the use of narcotics has forced many cancer patients with treatable pain to suffer compared with other
126
advanced countries." Physicians seem to fear that use of
narcotics to control pain might lead to addiction or shorten
the patient's life.
THENrnmuANm
The Netherlands was until recently the ofily nation in the
world to have legalized active euthanasia (it was joined in
2002 by Belgium). In fact, the Dutch Criminal Code, like the
German and Japanese codes, prohibits taking the life of another person "at the other person's express and earnest
request," and also prohibits murder, manslaughter, and assisted suicide. 127 Since the mid-1900s, however, Dutch
prosecutors have refrained from prosecuting doctors who
committed euthanasia when the doctors conformed with certain substantive and procedural requirements established by
the Supreme Court. 128 The court based these requirements
on its interpretation of Article 40 of the Criminal Code,
which provides: "A person who commits an offense as a
result of a force that he could not be expected to resist
12
[overmacht] is not criminally liable." ' In the 1984
Schoonheim case, a general practitioner was prosecuted for
killing a 93-year-old woman who was-near the end of her life
and suffering terribly, and had urgently requested euthanasia.
The court accepted the argument that the killing was justified because the doctor had resolved in a responsible way the
conflict between the professional duty to preserve life and
the duty to spare a patient from suffering, and thus met the
defense of necessity recognized by Article 40.130
In April of 2001, the Dutch Parliament, after two decades of debate, adopted the Termination of Life on Request
and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, which also
amended the Criminal Code and the Burial and Cremation
Act. This statute, which came into effect in 2002, legalizes
the practice of euthanasia and of assistance in suicide by
physicians where specific substantive and procedural requirements are met.13' The Act amends Articles 293 and 294 of
the Criminal Code, which prohibit killing on request and
assistance in suicide, to provide that those acts are not
illegal "if committed by a physician who fulfills the due
care criteria" of the Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide Act, "and if the physician notifies the
municipal pathologist" in accordance with S 7(2) of the
32
Burial and Cremation Act.1
The "due care" criteria of S 2 of the Termination of Life
on Request and Assisted Suicide Act require that:
a.
b.
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the physician holds the conviction that the request
by the patient was voluntary and well-considered;
the physician holds the conviction that the patient's
suffering was lasting and unbearable;
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c.

the physician has informed the patient about the
situation he was in and about his prospects;
d. and the patient holds the conviction that there was
no other reasonable solution for the situation he
was in;
e. has consulted at least one other, independent
physician who has seen the patient and has given
his written opinion on the requirements of due care,
referred to in parts a-d; and
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with
due care.
The Act further requires that a doctor who performs
active euthanasia or assists with suicide under the statute
must notify the local coroner of the death, providing the
coroner with a detailed report on compliance with the due
care requirements.,33 The coroner must in turn notify a regional review committee established under the Act for
reviewing euthanasia cases.'33 The coroner may also notify
the prosecutor, who may in turn inform the coroner and
regional review committee if he objects to the burial or cremation of the patient.1 35 The regional review committee
(which must include at least one legally trained member (the
chair), one physician, and one ethicist) reviews the report,
and decides whether the doctor has complied with the due
care criteria.' 36 The committee may inform the prosecutor
or the regional health care inspector if it concludes that the
statutory procedure has not been complied with.' 37
Doctors have long been expected to report cases of active euthanasia or assisted suicide to the local coroner.'13
Reporting has lagged well behind practice, in part because of
the reluctance of doctors to report their conduct to local
prosecutors.' 39 Under the new procedure, the government
hopes that reporting will become more accepted, as the committees will have the power to shield reporting physicians
from the threat of prosecution.'40
The recent legislation also clears up two matters that
had not been resolved in earlier court decisions. The first of
these is how the euthanasia law operates with respect to
children. Under the statute, a physician may terminate the
life of a child aged 16 to 18, or assist with his or her suicide
at the child's request, after consulting the child's parents.' 4 '
If the child is between 12 and 16, the attending physician
may only honor a request for euthanasia or assistance in
suicide if the child's parent or guardian agrees. 42 The second issue is that of persons who are incompetent, but who
had prior to becoming incompetent executed an advance
directive requesting that their lives be terminated upon reaching some future state of deterioration.'14 The physician may
honor this request if otherwise in compliance with the due
care criteria.
The statute does not require that the patient be in a
terminal condition. It does not even require that the suffering be physical. In the Chabot case in 1994, the Supreme
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Court recognized that the patient's "unbearable and hopeless suffering" could be mental rather than physical, though
it upheld the conviction of the psychiatrist in the particular
case for violating other requirements in euthanizing an inconsolably grieving woman at her request.144 Every year a
handful of psychiatric patients (2-5) are euthanized or assisted in suicide.
The statute does not address several important issues,
some of which are otherwise resolved by court decisions,
others of which remain unresolved. First, it does not address
the practices of withdrawal of medical treatment or of terminal sedation. These practices are generally accepted in the
Netherlands, and are specifically not considered to be euthanasia.'41 Dutch law, of course, permits competent patients to
request that life-sustaining treatments (including artificial
nutrition and hydration) be withdrawn or withheld.'14 Written advance directives, executed by a patient while competent
and refusing treatment under specified circumstances, are
also recognized under Article 450(3) of the Medical Contracts Act, though the statute also permits doctors to override

the refusal if there are "well founded reasons for doing so."147

Physicians may also withdraw or withhold treatment that
they regard as "futile."'

48

And doctors are permitted to ad-

minister drugs as necessary to relieve pain, even though the
pain medication may hasten death.'49 These practices are
regarded as "normal" medical practice, and deaths resulting
from them are regarded as natural deaths. They account for
far more deaths than euthanasia or assisted suicide, 38.5
percent versus 2.7 percent, according to a 1995 study.'5 0
Finally, the statute does not address the situation of patients in a persistent vegetative state (except if they have already
executed an advance directive). A recent case found a general practitioner guilty of murder for killing an 84-year-old
dying patient who was in a coma, but the court imposed
only a suspended fine as a sanction."'I Because the patient
was incapable of voluntarily requesting euthanasia, the
case was not covered by the statute. Surveys, however,
show that killing patients in the absence of a voluntary request is not uncommon (perhaps about 1,000 cases a year),
and might in some cases be found to be justified under the
defense of necessity where sustaining life could be regarded
2
as inhumane.,1

The practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands has been
widely condemned by external commentators, and is not
universally accepted within the Netherlands."' The new
Conservative government elected this past summer has pledged
to review the practice of euthanasia. A significant majority of
the Dutch population, however, seems to have accepted the
current practice of euthanasia. Dutch commentators also often claim that other countries permit very similar medical
practices, but simply do not admit to doing so. Without joining this debate, we must observe that the Netherlands firmly
holds down the most extreme position in its end-of-life law
of any country in our survey.

The Journalof Law, Medicine & Ethics

CONCLUSION

Each of the countries surveyed here addresses end of life and
pain management from its own unique legal perspective.
There seems to be consensus on a few issues (the right of
competent persons to refuse treatment), near-consensus on
more issues (the impermissibility of active euthanasia), yet
more diversity on others (the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment). Most countries recognize the use of large doses
of narcotics at the end of life to ease pain, yet in a number of
countries experts believe that pain remains undertreated.
While the common law countries on the whole take similar
approaches, the civil law countries are more varied in their
responses. Learning from the perspectives of other countries
might help us to understand our own law better, and perhaps
to improve it.
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